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Prototype inflow-based derivative contracts are designed to hedge irrigation risk in the 
Rio Mayo Valley of Sonora, Mexico. The results indicate that an 18-month contract is 
feasible given the specific characteristics of the region selected for the study. 
 
Introduction 
Regions of the Mexican Northwest are characterized by scarce precipitation, and 
rely almost entirely on reservoir systems to irrigate large cropping areas, provide water to 
urban centers, and even generate electricity. Irrigation, however, remains the most water-
intensive sector of those regional economies. In fact, in the dry states of Sonora, Sinaloa, 
and Baja California, irrigation takes up a high percentage of total water consumption 
(CNA). Despite the existence of irrigation systems, farm income is by no means shielded 
from weather uncertainties since the availability of water depends to a large extent on 
river inflows – a highly variable hydrological variable. When the annual accumulation of 
inflows is not adequate to replenish the reservoirs, agriculture is the sector that bears the 
major water cuts; consequently, cropping activities decline, rural unemployment 
increases, and farm income falls. Put differently, the annual variability of reservoir 
inflows represents the most important source of production risk for irrigated agriculture 
in these Mexican localities. Therefore, research that investigates potential risk 
management solutions is relevant not only from a purely academic viewpoint, but also 
from a policy perspective.  
Economists have recognized that the uncertainty surrounding reservoir inflows 
stymies the operation and management of irrigation districts. One body of literature has 
focused on the technical operation of reservoirs and proposed the use of several 
  1optimization techniques to develop reservoir operation policies that account for the 
stochastic nature of inflows [see Labadie for a recent survey]. Among the methods 
studied are stochastic dynamic programming (Dudley and Burt; Kelman el al; Stedinger, 
Sule, and Loucks), chance-constrained programming (Eisel), and chanced-constrained 
dynamic programming (Askew). These tools have been used since the 1960s to design 
the optimal size of irrigation districts, and to operate corresponding reservoirs. Although 
with these tools operators are better prepared to assess the impact of stochastic inflows, 
their application implies some opportunity costs and seldom guarantees a full risk-sharing 
solution.  As Dudley (1988a) puts it “why use stored water as an insurance medium when 
it evaporates and its presence in the reservoir increases reservoir spills.” Dudley suggests 
that storing output and revenues should also be included in the set of decision variables of 
reservoir operation models. 
Another body of literature has explored institutional approaches that rely on water 
markets and financial contracts to facilitate water allocations under uncertainty 
conditions. The institutions proposed include: developing option contracts and water 
markets to transfer irrigation supplies to urban centers (Michelsen and Young; Taylor and 
Young); interruptible water markets between power companies and agriculture 
(Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson); contracts to divert agricultural use towards 
ecological uses (Turner and Perry); sharing the capacity and volume of a reservoir 
(Dudley); and using a water bank (Iglesias, Garrido, and Gomez-Ramos). Furthermore, 
emerging research has focused on transferring new financial innovations to the 
management of weather risk in agriculture (Turvey; Hao, Hartell, and Skees; Skees and 
Enkh-Amgalan; Skees et al); however, research on the use of these innovations to hedge 
  2the income risk caused by stochastic reservoir inflows remains lacking, except for a few 
instances (Skees and Zeuli). 
This paper uses data from the Rio Mayo irrigation district to examine the 
feasibility of using an inflow-based derivative as primary insurance against water supply 
risk in irrigated agriculture. The analysis uses stochastic simulations to develop a set of 
risk management strategies that combine an inflow-derivative with reservoir operation 
policies, including pricing considerations. Moreover, a ranking procedure is employed to 
evaluate the simulated income distributions produced by each strategy according to the 
buyer’s risk preferences and downside risk measures. The framework developed in this 
paper, and insights derived from it, are relevant to decision makers, irrigators, and 
organizations interested in risk management strategies for irrigated agriculture.  
Irrigated Agriculture in the Mayo Valley 
Description 
  The Rio Mayo irrigation district is located in the southern part of the state of 
Sonora. The district includes an area of 98,598 ha suitable for irrigated agriculture, and 
groups 11,717 irrigators under 16 irrigation modules. The main source of water supply 
for the irrigation district is the watershed of the Mayo River (hence the name Rio Mayo), 
which covers an approximate area of 11,000 km
2. The river extends for approximately 
350 km and averages 1,000 million m
3 in annual streamflows. The hydraulic work used 
to secure the flows from the river is the Alfonso Ruiz Cortinez (ARC) reservoir, which 
has a storage capacity of approximately 1,200 million m
3. Approximately, 81% (825 
million m
3) of the water supply is used for irrigation, while the rest is allocated to other 
  3uses or lost due to evaporation. Please refer to Table 1 for descriptive statistics about the 
Rio Mayo. 
  The agricultural cycle in the Mayo Valley, as in other parts of the Mexican 
Northwest, is divided in two cropping seasons, namely Fall-Winter (FW) and Spring 
Summer (SS). On average, irrigators plant 100,000 ha in year, with 75% of the planting 
taking place in FW and 25% in SS. In terms of cropping patterns, the FW season (Figure 
1) carries the entire production of wheat, which is the main crop of the region, in addition 
to a substantial proportion of maize and safflower. In contrast, the SS season (Figure 2) 
has a variable crop pattern, but cotton and safflower are the dominant crops. The relative 
importance of the FW season is also reflected in the fact that, on average, the ARC 
reservoir stores 255 million m
3 (52%) more in October (beginning of FW season) relative 
to April (beginning of SS). 
Organization and Decision-Making 
   The Water Law of 1992 introduced reforms that had an impact in the organization 
and operation of irrigation districts in Mexico, including the Mayo Valley [see Naylor, 
Falcon, and Puente-Gonzalez, (2001) for more details on policy reforms]. Currently, 
there are three parties that jointly plan, distribute, and use water for irrigation purposes: 
the National Water Comission (CNA), the Limited Responsibility Society (SRL), and the 
irrigation modules. CNA is an autonomous government agency of the Mexican federal 
government in charge of regulating all aspects of water use and planning, including the 
operation of reservoirs and issuance of water concessions. On the other hand, irrigation 
modules are subdivisions of an irrigation district that represent their individual members 
in the decision-making process and also participate in the water allocation process. In 
  4turn, the SRL groups all the irrigation modules and is responsible for collecting fees to 
finance the operation the management of the irrigation district. 
In a typical irrigation cycle, the decision-making process starts when irrigators 
submit their individual irrigation plans to their corresponding irrigation module. In turn, 
the irrigation modules, the SRL, and CNA meet to estimate the water required to 
implement the irrigation plans, given the storage conditions in the ARC reservoir as of 
October 1. Although some negotiations may occur, CNA is the main decision maker 
about the annual release or supply of water. In times of drought, however, CNA’s 
decisions may entail strict modifications in irrigators’ cropping plans to accommodate 
irrigations supplies. At any rate, once water is released from the reservoir, the SRL 
receives and allocates the endowment of water to each irrigation module. Finally, the 
irrigation module delivers water to the parcels to be irrigated by individual irrigators.  
The Impact of Water Shortage 
In a place where the mean annual rainfall is only 260 mm (10.24 in), water is the 
most limiting factor in agricultural production. Figure 3 shows that there is a strict 
relationship between the annual plantings and the annual volume of water from the ARC 
reservoir made available for irrigation. For instance, in the year 1987-1988 when the 
agricultural sector received the lowest allocation of water (481 million m
3) in the 
historical series, the irrigation district registered the lowest number of hectares planted 
(70,202 ha). However, the effect of water shortages in the Mayo Valley has been more 
evident in the last four years when the annual plantings have declined to about 80% of the 
historical mean.  
  5Overview of Empirical Procedures 
A stochastic dynamic simulation model is employed to assess the potential for 
using an inflow-based derivative in the Mayo Valley. The stochastic part of the model is 
based on the simulation of the random process that underlies the seasonal inflows feeding 
the ARC reservoir. In addition, the model is composed of a set of reservoir operation 
policies or releases rules. The third and most important component is the contract design. 
In particular, several designs are integrated to the model and the resulting plantings 
cumulative distributions are ranked according to a risk preference procedure. Each 
component is briefly explained below. 
Inflow Simulations 
The streamflows of the Mayo River are defined by seasonal changes. Figure 4 
shows the mean monthly inflows for three selected periods for which data is available. 
The figure shows two important details that play an important role in the simulation. 
First, notice that most of the inflow accumulations take place in the SS season, 
particularly within the months of June and September. Second, the figure shows that 
although FW accumulations carry less weight, during the December-January months the 
inflows experience a small “bump.” In fact, the data shows that some years when the 
“bump” is large enough, the FW winter accumulation might be just as important as the 
SS accumulations. Rio Mayo farmers have recognized the value of those “bumps” to 
irrigate land during the SS season, and increase their revenues. 
In order to simplify the simulation, the monthly inflows were grouped in seasons 
corresponding to the agricultural cycle of the Rio Mayo irrigation district. Specifically, 
the FW accumulation period includes inflows from October to March and accounts for 
  635% of annual accumulations, while the SS accumulation period includes inflows from 
April to September and accounts for 65% of annual accumulations. Furthermore, there is 
a positive correlation of 0.23 between FW and SS inflows. 
The random process governing the random seasonal inflows was simulated using 
a multivariate empirical (MVE) distribution. The advantage of the MVE distribution is 
that it preserves the intra-year correlation structure in a satisfactory manner (Richardson 
2003). Table 2 compares the results of the simulation against the actual data for the 
seasonal inflows. Furthermore, statistical tests suggest that the mean and covariance of 
the simulated data correspond to those of the actual data.  
Reservoir Operation Policy and Planting Response Functions 
For a given volume of water, the agricultural output produced in an irrigation 
district depends on how water from the reservoir is operated (e.g. release decisions) and 
on the set of characteristics that determine the relationship between water and crop output 
(e.g. conveyance efficiency, temperature, distance, etc). One the one hand, although the 
reservoir operation policies used by CNA were provided to the authors, they did not 
produce results that matched the actual data on released volumes. Therefore, we relied on 
the hydrological data, the historical plantings, and the experience of Rio Mayo irrigators 
to derive the reservoir operation rules. The reservoir operation policy used for the 
simulation is based on the assumption that the marginal value product of water in the FW 
season is greater than in the SS, therefore for a given level of water in the reservoir 
irrigator will prefer more water to be allocated to FW rather than SS. On the other hand, 
there are physical and climate factors that suggest that the volume of water released from 
the reservoir leads to less than proportional increments in the number of hectares planted 
  7within a given season. Therefore, response functions for both seasons were developed 
that incorporated diminishing marginal returns to the use of irrigation water
1.  
Using the reservoir operation policy and the plantings response functions, the 
simulation yields results (i.e. planted hectares) that are not statistically different from the 
observed historical data. For instance, the FW historical records suggest that plantings are 
typically 75,900 ha and for the same period the simulation yields mean plantings of 
73,160 ha. Similarly, the SS historical data indicates that the mean plantings are 28,000 
ha and the mean simulated plantings are 27,745 ha. 
Contract Designs 
In this study we examine the feasibility of contracts that derive their value from 
the inflows of the Mayo River as measured in the site that feeds the ARC reservoir. In 
addition, the contracts are structured as option-type arrangements in which the buyer is 
entitled to a payment when the inflow index falls below some pre-determined strike 
value. In terms of pricing, two factors determine the full price the buyer will be charged: 
the “pure” premium and the loading factor. The pure premium is computed on the mean 
payment that the seller of the contract can expect to make in the long run. In turn, the 
pure premium is loaded with a 50% mark up to account for other factors that a potential 
                                                 
1 The combination of reservoir operation policies and response functions that matched the actual 
management decisions and economic outcomes are presented in the following equations: 
( )
5 . 1 1 _ 02 . 0 1 _ 005 . 0 187 Oct Stor Oct Stor RFW + − =  
1 _ 87 . 0 Apr Stor RSS =  
( )
5 . 1 8 . 8 380 000 , 21 RFW RFW PlantingFW − + − =  
( )
5 . 1 6 . 5 245 000 , 12 RFW RFW PlantingSS − + − =  
Where RFW and RSS refer to releases in FW and SS, respectively; Stor_Oct1 and Stor_Apr1 represent the 
volume of water stored in the ARC reservoir as of October 1 and April 1, respectively; PlantingFW and 
PlantingSS refer to the hectares irrigated in FW and SS, respectively. 
 
 
  8seller may consider when operating in a new market (e.g. administration, return on 
investment, uncertainty, reserves loading, etc.).  
In this study two basic types of contracts are considered and their difference lies 
in the period over which the inflow index is used to compute the payments and the 
number of triggers that determine the contract structure. The first type of contract is 
based on a 12-month inflows accumulation period and a single strike value to trigger the 
payments. Furthermore, by extending the accumulation period to 18 months and 
introducing multiple strike values in the structure of the payment-triggering rule a second 
type of contract is considered. While the second contract is more complex, it comes with 
the benefits of tailoring the contract more effectively to the “bumps” identified in Figure 
4. Whenever the “bump” is large enough, farmers obtain a higher-than-expected increase 
in the water supply, which allows them to increase their plantings during the SS season.  
The general structure of the put contracts is stated in equations 1, 2, and 3 below. 
Equation 1 describes the maximum payoff or indemnity paid by the contract, measured in 
hectare-equivalent income
2, in a given year, denoted by  t P . This maximum payment is a 
function of the first trigger and the volume of inflows accumulated throughout the 
previous time period, denoted by   and  , respectively. The indemnity rule is linear 
and pays only when the   accumulation falls short of the critical level represented by 
. Furthermore, the contract pays a TIC of 100 units of hectare-equivalent income for 
each m
C I 1 − t I
1 − t I
C I
3 that falls short of the critical level of inflows Ic.  
 
                                                 
2 Since data on costs of production and crop prices were not obtained, income and payoff from the contract 
will be approximated using a hectare-equivalent measure. In other words, annual plantings, rather than 
annual income, will be the basis for comparing the risk-return profile of the risk management strategies 
developed in the study.  
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In addition, equation 2 represents a discount rule that applies when the contract 
includes more than one time period (more than 12 months). In other words, the actual 
payment   received in a given year is equal to the maximum qualifying payment  t P t P  
discounted by the factor  . The discount factor   is computed according to equation 3 
and can take any value in the interval [0,1]. In particular case studied, the maximum 
payment 
D D
t P (computed using equation 1) is discounted if the volume of FW inflows 
accumulated in the second time period (i.e. October-March), denoted by   falls within 
the bounds of the upper and lower triggers, denoted by  and  , respectively. If   
falls short of the lower bound trigger, no discount rule applies and the contract pays 
exactly 
t I , 1
max I min I t I , 1
t P . However, if   exceeds the upper bound trigger then the contract makes no 
payment. 
t I , 1
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While the 12-month contract is straightforward, the 18-month contract may be 
better described with an example. Suppose the following parameters: Ic = 725, TIC = 100 
ha. Then, if the inflows corresponding to the period agricultural year 2005-2006 were 550 
  10million m
3, then maximum payment would be 17, 500 ha.
3 However, if inflows of 300 
million m
3 were registered in the period October 2006 to March 2007, then the payment 
would have to be discounted
4 to 50% of the maximum payment, which is 8,750 ha. 
Results and Discussion 
A set of possible contracts was structured by setting specific values to the 
parameters described in equations 1 and 3. In the case of equation 1, the following three 
values for the trigger Ic were selected: 700, 750, and 800 million m
3, which represent 
70%, 75%, and 80% of mean annual inflows. These parameters in equation 1 fully 
describe the structure of the single period or 12-month contract described above and 
represents the 12-month component of the multi-period contract. In the case of the multi-
period contract or 18-month contract, the following trigger values were selected for 
equation 3: 100 and 200 million m
3 for Imin (equivalent to 27% and 54% of the mean FW 
inflow accumulations, respectively); 300 and 500 million m
3 for Imax (equivalent to 81% 
and 135% of the mean FW inflow accumulations, respectively).  
Table 4 describes a set of 12 possible strategies that could be implemented in Rio 
Mayo irrigation district to hedge against irrigation risk. Each strategy is identified by the 
three parameters in the following format: Ic-Imin-Imax. For instance strategy 700-100-300 
denotes an 18-month contract that uses an Ic trigger of 700 million m
3, an Imin of 100 
million m
3, and an Imax of 300 million m
3.  The base case scenario, or case in which no 
risk management is used, is presented to establish a benchmark and compare the results 
from the set of strategies. In addition to mean income produced by each strategy, table 4 
reports certain criteria to measure the risk profile of each strategy, including the 
                                                 
3  () 500 , 17 100 550 725 = × − = ha P  
4  , supposing I ( 5 . 0 ) 200 ( ) 0025 . 0 ( 1 = − × − − = D ) min = 100 and Imax = 500. 
  11coefficient of variation (CV), value-at-risk probabilities (VaR), and conditional value at 
risk (CVaR)
5. The latter measures assume that the maximum income shortfall that the 
irrigation district tolerates within a given year is only 25% of mean income. In other 
words, we assume that shortfalls below 75,000 units of hectare-equivalent income impose 
tremendous burdens to the irrigation district.  
As reported in table 4, without any insurance strategy, the mean hectare 
equivalent income is 98,853 units and a relative income variation of 20.24% around the 
mean (coefficient of variation or CV). In addition, under the base scenario there is a 13% 
chance that income falls below the 75,000 ha threshold and the expected shortfall is 
approximately 8,342 units of hectare-equivalent income. As with any risk-sharing 
mechanism, adopting any of the risk management strategies implies that decision makers 
are willing to give up a fraction of their expected income to reduce their risk exposure. 
For instance, with a single-period or 12-month contract that starts to pay when the annual 
accumulation of inflows falls below 750 million m
3, the expected annual income is 
reduced to 96,017 units; however, the variation of income is reduced to 18.27% as 
measured by the CV, while the probability of falling short of the 75,000 units threshold 
declines to 11.2%, with mean shortfalls averaging 7,442 units.  
The results reported in table 4 also indicate that the 18-month contract seems to 
achieve a higher risk reduction at a more affordable price or premium. For instance, the 
800-00-00 contract costs 7,486 units of income and reduces the income variation to 
                                                 
5 VaR and CVaR are measures of downside risk. Typically, VaR refers the maximum loss or threshold for a 
given confidence level during a specific period of time. In the particular application we use the cumulative 
probability distribution to compute not the maximum loss, but the probability that the annual income falls 
below a given threshold. In other words, wee seek the probability value, given a certain tolerable threshold. 
While VaR provides the probability of income falling below the desired threshold, CVaR measures the 
mean value of the expected shortfall. In our case, the CVaR measure represents the mean value of the 
hectares below a given threshold. 
  1218.34%, the VaR probability to 11.4%, and the CVaR measure to 7,529 units of hectare 
equivalent income. Conversely, the 800-100-300 costs 3,275 units of income (only 44% 
of the cost of the 800-00-00 contract) and reduces the CV measure to 16.45%, the VaR 
probability to 6.3%, and the CVaR measure to 3,275 unit of income. As depicted in 
figure 4, the months of December and January experience a “lump” in the supply of water 
that feeds the ARC reservoir. However, during certain years the “lump” is large enough 
to replenish the reservoir before the full replenishment of the SS season starts. In the 
cases of large “lumps” the irrigation district has the ability to generate additional income 
from the extra plantings that result from the unexpected increase in the water supply. 
Since the 18-month structure takes the “lump” factor into account, the contract is better 
tailored to the particular conditions of the Rio Mayo system. In particular, the discount 
factor introduced in equations 2 and 3 recognize the fact that the need for insurance 
payments is reduced when a large “lump” augments the supply of water; consequently, 
the insurance premium is reduced and the contract becomes more affordable. 
Comparison across the summary statistics of the proposed contracts is of little 
help without a mechanism to weight the risk-return tradeoff implied by the strategies. For 
instance, if the decision makers would be interested in the most affordable alternative, the 
clear choice is the 700-100-300 contract costs only 1,802 units of income and effectively 
reduces the risk exposure as measured by the three risk measures. However, if the 
decision maker was more sensitive to risk, the 800-100-300 contract provides the greatest 
protection, but costs about 1,472 units of income more than the 700-100-300 contract (i.e. 
an 81% increase in price for a little bit more of insurance coverage). 
  13In the literature the most common method used to rank risky scenarios is 
stochastic dominance, although the mean-variance approach has also found some 
popularity. However, in this paper we use a new method proposed by Hardaker et al 
(2004) called stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (called SERF hereafter)
6. 
SERF ranks risky alternatives using their certainty equivalents (CE) over a defined range 
of risk aversion measures. In practice, the SERF is applied when the utility function 
selected to approximate the decision maker’s risk preferences has an inverse function that 
can be computed based on ranges in the risk aversion coefficient (RAC). Furthermore, 
the SERF method possesses the following advantages: it produces a smaller efficient set 
than its stochastic dominance counterpart; it provides a cardinal measure of the decision 
maker’s conviction for risk alternatives at each measure of risk aversion utilized. 
While some studies usually elicit risk attitudes directly from decision makers or 
incorporate those estimated in other studies in the same location, we did not engage in 
any activity to gauge the risk preferences in the Rio Mayo area nor we found any 
previous study to use as a guide. Therefore, we decided to approximate the unknown risk 
preferences from the collective group of farmers in the Rio Mayo by means of a power 
utility function
7. Furthermore, the power utility function is suitable for use in the SERF 
method proposed by Hardaker et al (2004). In addition, the analysis relies on the relative 
                                                 
6 SERF possess several advantages over generalized stochastic dominance, however the discussion of those 
ranking methods is outside the scope of this paper. Readers are referred to the Hardaker et al (2004) article 
for a full comparison between the methods. 
7 The analysis is based on a power utility function that exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The 
CRRA property is convenient to group all decision makers in the irrigation district regardless of their 
wealth levels. Furthermore, since wealth in this paper is measured in “hectares”, the CRRA property allows 
for preferences to remain unchanged when all the payoffs are converted to a monetary unit by multiplying 









1 , where   
refers to the relative risk aversion coefficient. 
r R
  14risk aversion measures proposed by Anderson and Dillon (1992), which range from a 
RAC of 0.5 for slightly risk aversion to a RAC of 4 for extremely risk aversion.   
The entire set of risk management alternatives is presented in Figure 5a. For each 
contract design the figure displays the certainty equivalent (hereafter CE) for each RAC 
within the range proposed by Anderson and Dillon (1992). Once the CE corresponding to 
each strategy is plotted against the CE from other strategies, the SERF efficient set is 
found by identifying the locus with the maximum CE values for a given RAC. For 
instance, Figure 5a clearly identifies that strategies 800-00-00 and 750-00-00 are the least 
preferred strategies for any level of risk aversion, while strategy 750-00-00 is dominated 
by all strategies with the exception of the 800-200-500 contract at very low levels of risk 
aversion. One reason behind this result is the 12-month contracts achieve risk-reducing 
results comparable to the 18-month contracts, but charge considerably higher prices, as 
presented in table 4.  
The SERF efficient set is presented in Figure 5b, which contains only following 
four strategies. Thus, for decision with RAC less than 1.52, the preferred strategy is the 
base case scenario. In other words, hardly to normal risk averse individuals (RAC 
between 0.5 and 1.5) prefer to self-insure using the reservoir operation policy to hedge 
against irrigation risk. Nonetheless at RACs greater than 1.52 the SERF efficient set 
contains only strategies that make use of the risk-sharing mechanism. For instance, 
modest risk-averse decision makers will prefer to use strategy 700-100-300 to manage 
water supply risk. As the level of risk aversion increases to higher levels, the SERF 
includes strategies 750-100-300 and 800-100-300. The fact that only 18-month contracts 
are included in the SERF efficient set reinforces the notion that contracts that take into 
  15account the higher-than-expected inflows that the Mayo River yields between December 
and January provide more cost-efficient income stabilization to farmers. 
The CE values of the SERF efficient set are presented in Table 5 for five levels of 
risk aversion. Using the differential in CE values measures the degree of conviction for 
the preferred strategies. For instance, slightly risk-averse decision makers would need to 
be paid a minimum between 616 and 1,229 units of income to buy the insurance (i.e. a 
subsidy). In turn, for moderate to extremely high levels of risk aversion, decision makers 
would need to be paid a certain amount to switch away from the preferred insurance 
strategy. For example, at modest risk aversion level, a sure minimum payment of 433 
units of income for farmers to give up the 700-100-300 contract to no hedging at all; 
while at very high risk aversion, the sure payment would need to be 1,405 units of 
income to forgo the 750-100-300 contract relative to no hedging. 
Conclusion 
This paper has introduced the use of prototype risk-sharing contracts in the Rio 
Mayo irrigation district. We conclude that these types of contracts have a promising 
potential to mitigate economic consequences of uncertain water availability in the Mayo 
Valley, particularly in reducing the downside risk in the income profile of farmers. More 
importantly, even when the prices of contracts have been marked up by 50%, the 
premium rates remain under the 10% mark, which indicates that they could be affordable 
from a buyer’s point of view. Affordable premium rates not only increase feasibility of a 
potential risk-sharing market in Mexico, but also reduce the need for government 
sponsorship to encourage farmer participation. 
  16Although two types of contracts were considered, we conclude that the 18-month 
contract is more effective in providing risk-reducing results at the most affordable rates. 
In particular, the risk ranking analysis indicates that the most attractive contracts for risk-
averse decision makers are very affordable with risk premium rates ranging from 3.9% to 
6.9%. However, one of the disadvantages of the 18-month contract is that after paying the 
insurance premium, farmers would have to wait 18 months to receive the indemnity 
payment, when they qualify for it. One of way to shorten the waiting period could be to 
introduce partial payments after the first 12-month sub-period has elapsed. 
  

























825.43 743.48 488.81 101.05
75.97 28.19
Standard Error  64.79  28.90 32.39 45.13 3.65 1.54 4.07
Median 914.50  824.70 685.00 415.39 99.24 78.86 20.62
Standard 
Deviation 
453.52 202.30 226.74 315.92 0.22
8.41 22.30












Notes: Data collected from CNA and SRL 
a: inflows, releases and storage are measured in million m
3 (1 cubic meter = 0.0008107 
acre foot = 35.315 cubic foot) for the period 1955-2004 
b: storage as of October 1 (beginning of agricultural cycle) 
c: production measured in thousand hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acre) 
d: Period 1969-2003 
e: Period 1973-2003 
 
 
Table 2 Statistical Properties for Simulated and Historical Data 
Variable Means Covariance 
   Historical  Series 
 FW  SS
FW
  369.8 111,631.6 18,934.3
SS
  664.5 18,934.3 53,971.7
   Simulated  Series 
 FWSIM  SSSIM
FWSIM   360.2 87,207.6  19,468.5
SSSIM
  662.9 19,468.5 58,768.8
 
Note: FW and SS represent the historical inflow accumulations corresponding to the 
periods of October-March and April-September, respectively. FWSIM and SSSIM 
  18represent the MVE simulated inflows corresponding to the periods of October- March 




Table 3 Distribution Comparisons of Simulated and Historical Inflow Data 
  Test Value Critical Value P-Value  Conclusion* 
2 Sample Hotelling T
2 Test
a 0.03 9.58 0.984 Fail to Reject H0
Box's M Test
b 1.21 11.34 0.750 Fail to Reject H0
Complete Homogeneity Test
c 1.19 15.09 0.946 Fail to Reject H0
Correlation Matrix Test
d 0.19 2.69 - Fail to Reject H0
 
* 99% level of confidence. 
aH0: Mean vectors are the same. 
bH0: Covariance matrices are equivalent. 
cH0: Mean vectors and covariance matrices are equivalent, respectively. 
dH0: correlation matrices are equivalent. 
 









Base 98,853.90  20.24 13.0% 8,342.59 NA  NA
700-00-00 96,789.95  18.39 13.1% 8,879.51 4,115.56 8.8%
750-00-00 96,017.97  18.27 11.2% 7,442.1 5,654.91 11.3%
800-00-00 95,099.59  18.32 11.4% 7,529.2 7,486.18 14.1%
700-100-300 97,950.14  17.80 8.5% 5,774.09 1,802.10 3.9%
750-100-300 97,617.39  17.14 7.3% 4,942.17 2,465.62 4.9%
800-100-300 97,211.54  16.45 6.3% 4,228.43 3,274.89 6.1%
700-100-500 97,716.22  17.56 9.1% 6,173.49 2,268.56 4.9%
750-100-500 97,288.88  16.87 8.0% 5,398.62 3,120.67 6.2%
800-100-500 96,772.36  16.14 7.3% 4,899.07 4,150.63 7.8%
700-200-500 96,486.17  16.08 7.7% 5,140.92 4,721.29 8.9%
750-200-500 97,075.36  16.76 8.5% 5,724.94 3,546.44 7.1%
800-200-500 96,486.17  16.08 7.7% 5,140.92 4,721.29 8.9%
 
Notes: 
NA: Does not apply. 
a: Each strategy is coded according to the following format (strike, Imin, Imax). Please refer 
to equations 1, 2, 3 for more explanation on the parameters of each contract. 
b: Measured in hectare equivalents. 
c: Coefficient of Variation (in %). 
d: Value at Risk evaluated at the 75,000 ha threshold (in %). 
  19e: Conditional Value at Risk at the 75,000 ha threshold in hectare equivalents. 
f: Insurance premium with a 50% mark up, expressed in hectare equivalent income. 





Table 5 CE Values of the SERF Efficient Set for Across Risk Aversion Levels 
  Risk Aversion Levels 
Strategy Very  Low  Normal  Moderate  High  Extreme 
Base  97,772.88 96,790.71 94,354.15 91,733.47 88,976.42
700-100-300 97,156.73 96,455.37 94,787.09 93,079.94 91,337.76
750-100-300 96,887.09 96,242.39 94,710.66 93,139.34  91,521.97
800-100-300 96,543.99 95,954.67 94,554.15 93,112.23  91,615.92
Note: Bold indicates highest CE for risk aversion level
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